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IMPOLITIC REINSTATEMENTS OF DISBARRED
LAWYERS
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver, Colorado, Bar
OME people intermittently criticize the few lawyers who
appear in court as counsel for persons charged with kidnapping, murder or highway robbery. In fairness to
such attorneys it should be said that they do not "defend"
criminals in any anti-social way. They but legitimately
invoke legal rules which, if applied, compel the state to produce better evidence or to conduct the prosecution more fairly.
In this end and in other respects they do no worse than their
ethical brethren who, in their civil practice, defend dishonest
clients. There are two classes of lawyers, however, that do
deserve censure: First, the few dishonest ones; and, second,
those who aid, abet, or whitewash the former in the ways
hereinafter suggested. This second group has been doing too
much in favor of disbarred attorneys who apply for reinstatement. That situation makes it timely to emphasize the
fact, or at least to submit and to defend the proposition, that
under no circumstances ought any lawyer to be restored to the
profession after a disbarment for acts of theft, embezzlement,
fraud or deceit. The victimized laymen would, without
much persuasion, agree with this thesis, but most members
of the bench and bar probably require to be reminded of, or
shown, reasons based on considerations of public policy or of
the interests of the profession before concluding that disbarments in general ought to be permanent and without hope of
reinstatement.
Heretofore a great many lawyers have
acquiesced in, and some have diligently worked for, reinstatements of even such professional outcasts as were in the category of embezzlers. In one case of a disbarred blackmailer
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"the petition for reinstatement was signed by seventy attorneys, said to include all but two of the members of the bars
of" three counties.1
The contempt for the profession, which many people feel,
is inspired or increased by the detected delinquencies of some
members, in spite of the good character of others. The public
and the private eye that can clearly see the discovered embezzler is myopic as to blameless lawyers. This is but one reason
among many for urging the permanent expulsion from the
bar of any member found dishonest either in his private or
professional capacity.
There is nothing to prevent one who is disposed to lie,
cheat or defraud from selecting the practice of the law as his
ostensible occupation. The result is that such a moral delinquent is as likely to be discoverable, as he has been, in this
profession as he is among bankers or stock salesmen.
To be successful in his deceitful attempts upon persons
of ordinary prudence he must have, as he has, the ability to
gain the confidence of his prospective or potential victims.
The art of so doing, ordinarily exercised without a specific
evil intent, also enables him to obtain the friendship of persons who never become either his actual or intended dupes.
Accordingly, it sometimes happens that a thousand or more
persons who have not defrauded are willing to testify to the
"good reputation" of some smooth and influential villain.
When they do so they possibly make inaudible or futile the
complaint of some lone sufferer from the artifices of the respectable thief.
The perpetrator of frauds deals honestly with his influential associates, not only because they are too wary to be
entrapped by any thieving scheme, but also in order that he
might on some future occasion use them as the makers of his
reputation. He cheats only some obscure persons. If he is
a lawyer, that fact gives him additional power for deceit. His
fraudulent designs are unsuspected because of the popular presumption that a member of the bar will not lie in his private
capacity. He is thought to be conforming to some stringent
system of "ethics" because his legal associates generally do.
Acting ostensibly because of a social disposition, but in fact
'See Ex parte Marshall

.Miss....

147 So. 791, 803.
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for selfish reasons, the refined and intelligent crook worms
himself into, and thereafter fortifies himself with, the friendship of the most influential persons. Consequently, it is not
surprising to find that governors of states have bestowed
favors upon persons later found guilty of confidence games.
The Supreme Court of Colorado once dealt with a case where
a disbarred attorney brazenly flaunted in its judicial face a
"pardon" issued by the chief executive of the territory.2 A
similar situation arose in Illinois, and in a New York case the
pardon was one issued by the President of the United States.3
The situation, psychological or otherwise, now sought to
be explained is illustrated by the reports of various disbarment and reinstatement proceedings. In one Oklahoma case
"judges and lawyers" testified to the "high social and moral
standing" of an applicant for reinstatement. The Supreme
Court was greatly impressed by that fact and reinstated him,
notwithstanding it had just observed that "respondent made
restitution." 4 A lawyer of any "moral standing" does not
do, nor has he done, things which call for "restitution." Such
acts ought to be expected only of common lay thieves without "social standing." The reports contain many cases where
a respondent in a disbarment proceeding or an applicant for
reinstatement has had prominent members of the bar testify
that he is "a lawyer of good reputation, of honesty and integrity." A South Dakota malefactor had also three exjudges of the Supreme Court endorse his application.5 In
one case the Supreme Court of Colorado, after striking the
name of a lawyer from the roll because of dishonest acts, immediately reinstated him for the apparent reason, among
others, that a number of eminent lawyers and judges "testify
to his good reputation." '
Naturally, the successful confidence man, whether layman
or lawyer, has a "good reputation." It is the chief instrumentality in his criminal activities. It is an easily constructed'
device for fraud, and works well provided self-serving discre'Matter of Browne, 2 Colo.
Peo. ex rel. v. George, 186
Y. S. 256.
'In re Snodgrass, 26 P. (2d)
'In re Egan, 218, N. W. 1.
'Peo. v. Essington, 32 Colo.

553, 558.
Il. 122, 57 N. E. 804; In re Kaufmann, 211 N.
756.
168, 171, 75 P. 394.
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tion is: used, or expedient delay taken, in the selection of victims. The court in the case last cited said of the delinquent
attorney:
"His conduct has been exemplary except in
the instances charged in the information."
The conduct of any occasional criminal is "exemplary except
in the instances" where the criminality is manifested.
Some bar associations resist reinstatements, but others,
neglecting the functions they are presumed to perform, sometimes exert themselves to the utmost to procure the reinstatement of some previously expelled member. Tending to be
illustrative in this connection is a case where the reinstatement of an attorney disbarred for embezzlement was unanimously recommended by the Bar Association of Kent County,
Delaware.7 The beneficiary of such a favor was a self-confessed embezzler of the funds of an estate. As might be
expected, the malefactor was fervidly represented to the court
as one reformed and as "a person of integrity and good character." If a bar association is disposed to eulogize and coddle
its socially prominent criminals, instead of purging itself of
them, the public is justified in holding the entire group in
contempt, and would be stupid to do otherwise.
It may be of interest to note that the "prominent lawyers" who willingly devote both time and energy toward
restoring embezzlers to the bar never contribute to a restitution fund for the benefit of the parties betrayed, injured or
ruined by the applicant whose petition for reinstatement they
endorse. They do not even pause to inquire as to the condition or wishes of the persons who suffered at the hands of the
swindler. Possibly among such "busy" class-conscious lawyers were those who could not spare five minutes towards
helping to find a position for a law school graduate who has
no "eminent" uncle already in the profession.
The "good reputation" of the embezzler applying for
reinstatement does not assuage the misery of those who bore
the loss, especially when the stolen funds become needed for
immediate medical attention or emergent hospital care. To
them the bar's solicitude and a court's compassion for the
respectable thief is an insult added to the injury already re'In re Hawkins, 87 At. 243.
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ceived. Naturally they are thereafter disposed to assist in
creating public sentiment against the entire legal "crew."
They are excusable in surmising that the numerous lawyers
who offered testimonials in favor of the miscreant did so
because of consciousness of secret guilt of similar misconduct.
The defrauded clients or betrayed associates are not in a poetic
mood and derive no comfort from the fact that some judge,
in reinstating the disbarred attorney, gazes upon the culprit
with a benign countenance and recites:
"The quality of mercy is not strained;
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blestIt blesseth him that gives and him that takes..
To the victims such expression from the bench is but a vain
hoot of a judicial owl.
If any one group of citizens ought to be depended upon
to support deserved disbarments and to resist the reinstatement of corrupt disbarred attorneys it is the committee on
grievances of any bar association, yet cases may be found
where even such a presumably strict vigilante group has recommended reinstatements. Sometimes, as if ashamed to take
all the responsibility, it procures and submits also endorsements from bankers and businessmen. Again, it may evasively recommend a "reinstatement on probation."
It may be of interest to note that often when a court disbars a lawyer there is a loud blare of the judicial trumpets,
proclaiming the necessity that a member of the bar shall
"demean himself with scrupulous propriety." In at least a
few cases, however, when a few months later the expelled
malefactor stealthily creeps back to the same tribunal with a
petition for reinstatement, appearing with a formidable array
of counsel and furnishing the court with a cartload of testimonials from "eminent" lawyers and ambitious politicians,
reinstatement is granted "without written opinion." What
was once properly done with commendable private and official pride, and publicly explained, seems in some cases to be
later undone, secretly and silently.
The courts that have the power to reinstate naturally feel
the pressure of such bar association action as was manifested
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in the Delaware case, and naturally consider testimonials
from lawyers and laymen. If they yield to such persuasion
they are not as much at fault as the attorneys who support
the petition for reinstatement. But, to their great credit,
many such tribunals do not always surrender their common
sense or appreciation of justice. 48 A. L. R. 1236, 1240,
cites many cases where a reinstatement was denied. A New
York court refused to conform to the wishes of "many prominent lawyers" to reinstate a man who "did not deny the
charges against him, culpable as they were." 8 A California
court denied reinstatement to a convicted embezzler who had
received "a full pardon by the governor" and submitted to
the court "numerous testimonials from officials and other
persons." 9
So great has been the pressure brought to bear upon courts
in behalf of disbarred embezzlers who had "friends" in the
pulpits, in the Chamber of Commerce, and at the bar, that
the judges have tried in some instances to counteract it by
formulating rules regarding the sufficiency of the proof of the
alleged "good character" at the time of the petition for reinstatement."0 But generally the test applied was altogether
too easy for the petitioner pretending repentance and reformation. In substance, it was, and is, if restored to the bar will
he be upright? 1 The result has been that one outspoken
jurist could say:1"
"We have refused to disbar and have reinstated men who
betrayed their clients. We have refused to disbar and have
reinstated men who stole their clients' funds. We have refused to disbar and have reinstated men who bear the felon's
brand. We have shown mercy to men whose acts were dishonorable and reprehensible. We have shown mercy to men
whose acts made black the escutcheon of the bar."
Occasionally a court is hard pressed for reasons with
which to justify an order of reinstatement. Thus in one case
the Supreme Court of Montana found that "no reason exists
the
why the applicant should not be reinstated," because "...
'Matter of Clark, 112 N. Y. S. 777.
'In re Riccardi, 64 Cal. App. 791, 222 Pac. 625 (1923).
"*6 C. J. 615, note 84.
116 C. J. 615. note 81.
"Hilliard, J. in Peo. v. Lindsey, 93 Colo. 41, 58.
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larceny upon conviction of which the petitioner was disbarred was committed while the petitioner was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor," and "since
' 13 the order of disbarment was made he has become sober.
Reinstatements are sometimes granted, not on the court's
independent consideration of the application, but because of
recommendations of a bar association. Thus in a New Jersey case the applicant had been guilty of many thieving and
disreputable acts. 14 He had been convicted in a criminal court
of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, and
at the time of his application had not made full restitution to
his victim. 5 The court reinstated him chiefly because the
Camden County Bar Association, "after a thorough investigation, unanimously asked for his reinstatement."
The
"thorough investigation" did not disclose that the applicant
had not obtained money by false pretenses, and had not embezzled monies at various times. His failure to make restitution was said to be due to inability. The bar association
ignored the question whether applicant could have foreseen
such inability at the time of the larcenous acts. If a full
restitution had been made, that fact would have been seized
upon as an additional reason for reinstatement. The court
itself found a way to evade the obvious converse of the situation. It quoted from a Delaware decision where, in a like
case, it was said that a "thoroughly good man may be unable
to make any restitution at all." It may be submitted that if
one is under a legal or moral obligation to make a "restitution" of stolen funds, that very obligation precludes the possibility that he is "a thoroughly good man." As well say
that a "thoroughly good man" is unable to bring back to life
one whom he has murdered. One hundred and twenty-five
witnesses testified for the applicant. One was a "former
judge," another a "Congressman." The report is instructive
to prospective wrongdoers. It teaches them not to steal from
a "judge" or a "Congressman," but rather to victimize some
obscure widow. Her feeble cries of distress will be drowned
out by the vociferous testimonials of lawyers, judges, busi"In re Newton, 70 Pac. 982.
"In re Harris, 66 N. J. Law 473, 49 Atd. 728.
"In re Harris. 88 N. J. Law 18. 95 At. 761.
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nessmen, and Congressmen. Why so much solicitude for a
lawyer thief? No array of attorneys and politicians rush to
the aid of a shopgirl who steals a ribbon. There is no reinstatement for her, even if her employer is one of the businessmen who comes to the aid of a thieving lawyer.
It may be of interest to note that among the things which
influenced courts to exercise "discretion" in favor of a reinstatement is a situation indicated in the following words of a
brief quoted by the Oklahoma court:
"His father was a distinguished lawyer; his
family for several hundred years back have been in
the legal profession."
Ordinarily such a fact ought to militate against the applicant, and the court should terminate the local professional
dynasty. We have no Mongolian system of caste. If this is
a land of equal opportunity an applicant for reinstatement
ought to be in a better position if his counsel is able to say:
"His father was a lazy section hand; his family for several hundred years back have been without education or property."
Sometimes when a court restores to the profession a disbarred blackmailer or embezzler it professes to believe "that
men are, and may be, rehabilitated when they have yielded to
What is thus
temptation, when they have repented."'"
assumed by them is but a half-truth. Persons guilty of some
crimes may be "rehabilitated." Reinstatements may be justly
granted in cases where disbarment resulted from intemperance, negligence, crimes of passion, or strong language in
books or briefs. Emotional instability is curable or at least
excusable in most cases, but the disposition to cheat generally
is not. Dishonesty in an educated adult is a permanent yellow streak in his psychic constitution, but even if not, disbarment resulting from it ought to be permanent. Ordinarily, if the guilty lawyer fears to renew fraudulent practices
by overt acts he is apt to do so vicariously by advising selfish
clients how to commit frauds without detection or punishment.
"See Ex parte Marshall, 147 So. 791. 794.
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The intelligent lawyer of mature years who has been
found flagrantly dishonest on one occasion is forever prone
to relapse into delinquency and remains potentially a worse
miscreant, notwithstanding that the contrary may be assumed
in what is tearfully said about him in a subsequent memorial
meeting of a bar association. It is a curious fact, psychological or otherwise, that untruthful and dishonest persons who
observe that numerous friends believe in, and are sincerely
testifying to, their "honesty and integrity," yield to the suggestion and become unconscious of their own turpitude or
moral instability. In 1902 a Montana lawyer was disbarred
for fraud and deceit. One year thereafter he asked to be reinstated. The court then observed that his petition "does not
state anything which shows that the applicant has a just conception of the serious nature of the several charges made and
proven against him, or that he in anywise regrets having
done any of the things which he did." 17 That characterization almost typifies the psychology of one kind of a respectable
crook. After participating in, or creating, a fraudulent transaction he proceeds to conceive a series of ideas which convince
him of self-justification and ultimately overcome all sense of
guilt. Thus the embezzler can face the world with an air of
innocence after a little loose thinking or imagination on his
part that at the time of the theft he intended to make restitution before detection, or that at the time of the deceit he
did not acutely realize that he was perpetrating an injurious
falsehood. He may deem himself guiltless because he is financially unable to meet a legal or moral claim, evading thought
of the fact that at the time the obligation was entered into he
knew that such inability was imminent or already present,
and concealed that material circumstance from the one with
whom he dealt. It is possible, also, for a refined crook to
induce a sense of self-righteousness by doing a little charitable
work or performing some kind acts. Such incidental conduct serves not only as a jag which deadens the consciousness
of wrongs committed but also as an exhibit in proof of a good
character. The "reputation" thus bolstered up may be utilized to camouflage further fraudulent intents or to escape the
consequences of detected misdoings. If caught in the com"In re Weed, 72 Pac. 653.
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mission of a good sized theft or extortion so that the "reputation" fails to work as an immunity bath, there may be a
plea of "a. nervous breakdown" and a few friendly physicians
and psychiatrists then do the whitewashing.
When "eminent lawyers" testify to the "good character"
of some ex-thief they desire to have restored to their ranks,
they may be sincere, but let it be remembered that they would
have had the same testimony, had it been called for, prior to
the time of the criminal or dishonest acts which resulted in
the disbarment.
A common motivation for a court's refusal to disbar a
dishonest lawyer or for ordering the reinstatement of one
already disbarred, is the sympathetic desire that he be permitted to earn money in the way in which he has been trained,
presumably in order that he might not become "poor." But
poverty has been the condition of many honest lawyers while
in active practice as well as in their declining years. Embezzlers are not made of such finer clay that ways of affluence
must be provided for them. Most of the disbarred do not
actually suffer when no petition for reinstatement is pending.
They evade the soup line. Many of them are given good
positions by some of the "eminent" lawyers who afterwards
clamor for their reinstatement. In one reported case the court
observed that an applicant for reinstatement "has been in the
employment, as general assistant and confidential managing
clerk" of a prominent law firm.
The disbarred lawyers do not seem to be satisfied with
subordinate positions with practicing attorneys. They want
to be "big shots" in the estimation of the general public. But
they are not too good for mere "jobs." Many lawyers abler
than they are simply associated with some attorney or firm.
Dishonest men are not worthy even to be messengers in a
law office. However able, they are not needed in any capacity,
in the light of the fact that the law schools are furnishing
many able young men with high ideals and who are capable
of filling any legal position or practicing law alone.
Ways are being sought to prevent the profession from
being overcrowded. It is unfair arbitrarily to "flunk" any
competent law school graduates who take a bar examination.
However less expedient, it would be more just to weed out
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the dishonest practitioners, if any there are, regardless of age
or ability. There is no way of doing this effectively because
the unscrupulous lawyers are clever enough to conceal their
moral obliquity from upright associates. What can be done,
however, is to encourage betrayed clients to make complaints,
and to urge laymen who have been defrauded by any lawyer
to disclose their respective experiences. It is timely, also, for
those able to be heard, to denounce the practice of attempting
to undo a deserved and belated disbarment by endorsing a
petition for reinstatement. A good start in that direction
was made by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin when it rebuked
the sixty lawyers of Dane county for filing a petition, ostensibly as friends of the court, in behalf of an accused in a disbarment proceeding. 8 The Supreme Court of South Dakota, when deluged by testimonials, cited that case with approval and pointed out that lawyers who sign petitions in
favor of reinstatement, merely because of sympathy for the
applicant, are "unmindful of their obligations as attorneys
and officers" of the court."9
"In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927).
"In re Egan, 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1, 15 (1928).

ANOTHER WAY TO ELEVATE THE BAR
By BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denver Bar

HE apotheosis of formal legal education still continues.
Cunningly prepared tracts plead that every state grant
admission to the bar only after three years in an approved
law school, with a prior college course. Mapped in purest
white are those loyal sovereignties meeting these requirements,
in shaded tones those which have compromised with their
ideals, in solid black the recalcitrants which have utterly
failed. The claim is made that compliance will produce a bar
better able to dispense law, freer from objectionable characters, of greater social value, and, though unexpressed, the
thought may also be present that competition will be lessened.
Without stopping to deny the claims of the newspapers and
our own clients that we lack learning, ability and conscience,
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which we deplore, although it does not crush our spirit, and
without controverting, but affirming, that a college education
does have value, the insistence upon academic training as the
principal, if not the sole, means of improving the standards
of the bar appears, to use a harsh expression, childish. This
article is an effort to tell why.
The fundamental reason is that there are, after all, limits
to what one may be taught at an educational institution. It
is not to be expected that this fact would have been perceived,
in its fullest extent, by the faculties of our universities. To a
college professor, whatsoever the difficulty may be, the remedy is always more college education; jurisprudence, like every
other subject, begins and ends for him with a college degree.
Many lawyers, at graduation, have shared this feeling, but
subsequent experiences have often modified this view. Even
in our government, which uses "brains" and "degrees" as
synonyms, the absolute sufficiency of dogmatic learning as
the ultimate qualification is still an open question. So in
the field of legal education as well we may have relied too
much upon the academic and too little upon the practical as
a means of preliminary training; for while it is true that the
rules of law can best be learned by intensive study under scholarly preceptors, and that mental discipline, industry, and
thoroughnes will probably be acquired at the same time, the
public does not complain of a lack of this kind of knowledge
or of these qualities: what the public wants is lawyers who
are more practically competent and more dependable. No
law school can hope to meet that demand without some help
from the outside.
The average college graduate emerges from the halls of
learning blinking at the sunlight of daily affairs as a forest
dweller coming out upon an open prairie. His contacts with
commerce, domestic relations, civil wrongs, crime, have been
largely second hand. In those unfamiliar fields, however, he
is now to act as a hired adviser to clients whose own experience has already provided them with a broader, if less specific,
knowledge than his own, and whose points of view must be,
to the younger attorney, a closed volume. If, for example,
the problem is one of commercial law, what can the recent
graduate actually know, from experience or otherwise, of the
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probable effect upon his client of his recommendation or of
its desirability from a practical business standpoint? In a
criminal case he is at a disadvantage in considering motives
and the circumstances inducing or justifying the things done.
In the courtroom developing testimony, or estimating a jury's
reaction to it is, for a beginner, extremely difficult. The average younger lawyer, in such situations, asks the advice of
an older member of the bar, as he should; yet, if he needs
guidance himself, why has he been adjudged fit to guide the
public? Sometimes, in one's earlier years, the blind lead the
blind. This is a matter of such common knowledge that
every beginner is necessarily doomed to an apprenticeship in
the school of experience of varying duration. Since this is
true, then perhaps an apprenticeship should be required before admission to the bar is complete.
Practical preliminary experience is just as important as a
preventive of professional wrongdoing. Breaches of professional ethics are sometimes caused by the difficulty of the lawyer's decisions, which are always difficult, or he would not
have been employed to make them. We refuse to hire children for heavy labor, but we do put young and comparatively inexperienced lawyers to solving the most difficult
moral questions in the community. It might be better, both
for the lawyer and the public, to first give him some preliminary experience, so that his tendencies might be observed, if
necessary, and so that his ability to meet these difficult questions might be tested and developed by practice.
Besides all this, not all lawyers are professionally ambitious; some are lawyers by relative. A parent, uncle or aunt
who saved a competence by hard work and thrift, decides that
the youngster shall never toil as they did, but shall study law.
Many of the products of such schemes are sufficiently gifted
to succeed; others fail. Probationary training would, however, save more of them for better work in other fields.
Such a plan would not deprive recent graduates of their
rightful means of livelihood; they ought to earn as much as
apprentices as most lawyers now earn while building up what
is, in its earlier stages, laughingly referred to as a practice.
A young lawyer's first years are spent in becoming known,
and he can become known just as well serving as a probation-
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ary or junior member of the bar as in any other way. It
might also be added that the theory that anyone who has
passed a bar examination is entitled to a living is one which
has not yet been worked out as a practical matter.
The question then remains as to how long such a period
of probation should continue. Certainly, although in most
states one may now be admitted to the bar at twenty-one, the
apprenticeship should continue far beyond that point in life,
for at twenty-one mental maturity has not even set in. The
conception that one becomes a man at twenty-one arose
among people who judged maturity by ability to swing a
sword or broad-axe. A Roman did not attain majority until
twenty-five, and among the ancient Jews, who above all ancient peoples placed importance upon the things of the mind,
full age was reached at thirty, as being the age at which
mental maturity was attained. If we should fix the age for
admission to the bar at that age of maturity, we might remedy most of the ills of which complaint is now made.
Were this article proceeding along orthodox lines, reference to the superiority of the British and Canadian systems,
and to numerous scientific and legal works would now be in
order. The author is, however, fortunately unfamiliar with
the English judicial system, and finds citation of authority as
impossible to him as it would be tedious to his readers. The
argument must rest upon those broad, fundamental principles among which one advocate is as good as another as long
as his lungs hold out.
The program proposed, simply stated, is this: Let prospective lawyers continue as heretofore to take their formal
examinations while fresh from law school, and issue to all
who pass a certificate which will entitle them, if in the meantime they lead a blameless life and maintain some contact with
the law, to enter upon its practice at the age of thirty years.
Let them then seethe quietly on the back of the stove until
that age is reached. They can serve as apprentices or assistants in law offices, or, if this proves unsatisfactory, can employ their talents elsewhere. When the required age has been
reached it will be found that a good many of the original
aspirants have turned to other lines and have been so successful that they regard the law with a cold and fishy stare; that
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the manual labors of other aspirants have unfitted them for
confining work, and that they know it; that other aspirants
are already in jail; and that some of the remainder really want
to be lawyers. The remaining few would be experienced
enough, by that time, to know what their work means and
involves; their opinions would carry weight with a judge
even when not supported by a taxicab full of law books; their
clients would instinctively know them to be worthy of confidence; their advice and counsel .would be of value to their
communities. The practice would be improved, the numbers at the bar would be reduced, an era of good fellowship
would be ushered in, and we would be one step nearer the
millennium.
GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES
By OMAR E. GARWOOD, of the Denver Bar
HE Federal Annuities Act, by Congressman David J.
Lewis of Maryland, was introduced in the 73rd Congress, and will come up for action at the ensuing session.
The act is notintended as a substitute for old age pensions,
but is supplementary thereto. It is designed to provide annuities similar to life insurance annuities for men who feel an

increasing necessity and desire to obtain security against the
future by depositing regular monthly sums with the government so that upon the expiration of a given number of years,
or in case of death, a fixed annual income will be paid to the
annuitant or his beneficiary. It enables persons who now
have earning capacity to set aside monthly sums which will
pay them annual income after earning capacities have ceased
or suffered diminution.
The bill puts control of the government's annuity system in the hands of the treasury department, and the postal
system will administer the plan, along lines similar to the
present postal savings.
The government's annuity system will not be in competition with insurance companies, because the act restricts government annuities to smaller amounts. Life insurance annuities have always been regarded as available only to people of
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considerable means, but the Lewis bill will make annuity
privileges accessible to people in every station of life. It is
the first opportunity yet offered for safe annuities to people
of small means.
An interesting feature of the plan is that it will be of
equal benefit to the government and the annuitants. Proponents of the measure assert that in time the United States
could fund its entire national debt of thirty billion dollars
through annuities, instead of interminably issuing bonds, and
could save billions in interest, and at the same time promote
thrift among a large class of its citizens who have never
dreamed of being able to obtain an annuity.
Government annuities are not new; they are 2,000 years
old. England's use of annuities has been thoroughly successful, and at one time almost the entire funded debt of the
British Empire rested on the basis of annuities. The Canadian annuity system is also very successful.
Life insurance annuities have increased 300 per cent during the last three years. It is evident that an increasing percentage of American people are becoming annuity-conscious.
The safety and certainty of annuities is doubtless the main
factor in this growing interest. Government annuities would
be looked upon as the safest obtainable anywhere.
One outstanding attractive feature of the Lewis plan is
in connection with the yield on deferred annuities by which
dividends may be left to accumulate at compound interest, a
feature rarely found in any other form of investment.
It is said that President Roosevelt is much interested in
the annuity plan, and that treasury officials have been working on the details for many months.
Actual figures show that five out of every six persons in
the United States are totally dependent at the age of sixtyfive. During the years of favorable earning capacity they
have failed to make any safe provision for income in the declining years. Many believe that one of the main reasons for
this unfortunate situation is that people of small means have
had no safe channel through which they could lay a proper
foundation for such future income. The Federal Annuity
Plan fills this great necessity and offers a new opportunity.
The plan will be of great aid to the government, and at the
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same time be of invaluable service to our people; yet it will
not put the government into competition with the old line
annuity companies; as a matter of experience it is found that
government annuities increase the business of old line companies because of the tendency to make people more annuityconscious.
It is imposible for the government to risk any losses on the
annuity plan as the funds received from annuitants can be
kept working constantly in government securities; the annuities will be paid on the same mortality tabulations as are used
now by the old line companies, but the cost to annuitants
will naturally be lower because the government will be able
to eliminate many of the expenses now carried by private
companies.
BEGINNING OF THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
(From Recollection of F. T. Johnson, District Judge, 1895 to 1907.
Submitted by Hon. S. W. Johnson, Judge of the First Judicial District.)
The Denver Bar Association was organized by Robert
Bonynge, Robert H. Latta and myself in the old Symes
Building in 1887. We met and drafted a set of by-laws and
circulated a petition among the lawyers for the signatures of
those desiring to join. A large number were secured as members and meetings were held off and on at various places, at
which law questions and subjects of interest to the profession
were discussed. This organization, simple in plan and loosely
held together, continued until the incorporated Bar Association took its place. What records of these meetings may remain I do not know, and of the list of early membership
only a few survive. Robert Bonygne became Congressman
and after serving his term removed to New York City. Robert H. Latta, now deceased, was long known to the profession
as publisher of The Colorado Graphic. His activity and acquaintanceship with the lawyers had much to do with the
success of the early organization.
I believe that in the period mentioned there were about
100 lawyers in Denver. Perhaps not more than fifty constituted the leaders of the profession, while the rest were obliged
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to earn a living by practicing law in less important ways.
This less fortunate group was made up of the young lawyers
and beginners, of which I was a part. We did not have
access to encyclopedias and modern law treatises and index
systems, and very few had access to law libraries, but reliance
was had on reasoning, analysis and individual tact in handling a case. Typewriters were not available to many, and
we wrote out in longhand most of our court pleadings. Pomp
and ceremony was not known in court procedure, but good
oratory was popular with litigants, juries and audiences.
The environments of the young struggling lawyers led
them to seek closer union with their fellows, and this brought
about the organization of the Bar Association which now
forms a large and important part of the life of the legal profession.
SAY IT ISN'T SO
Berton T. Gobble, Esq., of the bar of the Supreme Court of Colorado (which will be new deal commencing in January next) deplores
the notion that he seeks publicity but feels the call of duty requires him
to announce that he is "in no way connected with the firm of Gettum,
Gobble and Takum, Inc., Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, whose
advertisement appears on page 580 of the September, 1934, American
Bar Association Journal." His postscript query, "What are your advertising rates?" we refer with scorn to the business office, beaded, we are
informed and perhaps believe, by the M. Grossman and the Mlle.
Edison.
What with the farmer getting paid for the hogs, corn and cotton
he didn't raise, why not solicit membership in a lawyer's club for the
purpose of making claim to Uncle Sam for the number of lawsuits we
didn't take?

IT'S MUTINY
Sidney S. Jacobs, Esq., local proctor in admiralty, flagged us
down to give his deposition that in 4 F. (2d) 358 the Minnesota
United States District Court determined this knotty problem by passing the buck: "Whether 'Ry-Krisp' is bakery goods or a cooked cereal
food preparation is a question for the Interstate Commerce Commission."

cDictaphun_]
EXPLANATION
The low, moaning sounds heard upon the publication of DICTA
for October last have been ascertained to have proceeded from the ghost
of the late Francis Bacon. Thus the age-end controversy as to the
authorship of Hamlet, etc., etc., has been settled. To make the test
scientifically certain a copy of "Button, Button, Who Has the Grand
Jury, or, Hamlet Murdered," was laid on Bacon's grave, and the body
promptly turned over. I was there, Charlie.

HE WOULD HAVE TO BE
An esteemed contemporary, published weekly in Denver, sounds
the praises of Denver's new deal representative. Inter alia:
"Mr. Lewis is a man of energy, intelligence and ability, familiar
with the demands and problems of the great agricultural territory which
constitutes the First Congressional District of Colorado."

SO YOU WON'T TALK, EH?
The learned Colorado Graphic has not mentioned this department since its isue of August 25, Anno Domini 1934.
BIG DOINGS IN THE COUNTY COURT
From the pages of the erudite Colorado Transcript, "Colorado's
Oldest Weekly Newspaper," published at the capital of Jefferson county,
we select these items, referring you for substantiation to the issue of
that journal bearing date October 11, 1934. It would appear that
Lerg, J., new deal county judge, was very much on the job.
"The (county court) jury was called for October 8, and twenty
of the twenty-eight called appeared. Those absent were excused on
various grounds such as death several years prior to the date set for their
appearance."
"The case of the State of Colorado against Lundy was also heard
and the court without the aid of a jury found the defendant reasonably
guilty and fined him $25 and costs."
Anent Alice in Wonderland, the lowly crustacean broke into print
recently in Lewis v. Jake's Famous Crawfish, 36 P. (2d) 352.

BILLS AND NOTES-EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY-RECORD-HOLDER
AFTER MATURITY-RELEASE OF ATTACHMENT-Vigil Us. Pacbeco-No. 13586-Decided Oct. 1, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
These parties appear in reverse order. This was a suit to cancel a
promissory note. Defendant counterclaimed and sued out a writ of attachment. A general demurrer to cross-complaint was filed and ruling
reserved. On trial, plaintiff has judgment.
1. The evidence is ample to support the judgment.
2. The credibility of witnesses, weight of the evidence and inferences therefrom are for the court.
3. The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
successful party.
4. The holder after maturity takes subject to defenses, including
illegality and want of consideration.
5. Judgment against attaching parties releases the property, restores proceeds, if any, and dissolves the writ.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WIDOW NOT ENTITLED WHERE SEPARATED FROM HUSBAND--Clarke vs. Clarke, et al.-No. 13592-

Decided Oct. 1, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Edward Clarke, an employee of the City and County of Denver,
was struck and killed by lightning while in the course of his employment. Claim for compensation was made before Industrial Commission by his widow, sister and mother. Compensation was awarded the
mother alone and this was affirmed by district court.
1. A widow is properly excluded from compensation where it
appears she was separated from her husband at time of his death and
was not dependent upon him in whole or in part.--Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-APPEAL BOND-AFFIDAVIT OF INSUFFICIENCY-NEW BOND--Walker vs. First Industrial Bank-No.

13597-Decided October 1, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1.

Upon appeal from the justice court to the county court, the

sufficiency of the appeal bond may be attacked by motion supported by
affidavits, and it is proper for the county court to consider such affidavits.
2. The county court is under no legal duty to give a litigant
repeated opportunities to file a sufficient bond, but it has the discretionary power to do so.--Judgment affirmed.
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PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE--JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AFTER ISSUE
TENDERED-RECOUPMENT-LIMITATIONS-Wyatt vs. Burnett

-No. 13599-Deecided October 1, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
I.
In an action by a physician to recover for services rendered, a
judgment on the pleadings in his favor is prejudicial error where the
answer had put in issue the value of such services.
2. The answer, in such a case, may allege the physician's negligence by way of recoupment, notwithstanding the provisions of Ch.
130, S. L. 1925.--Judgment reversed with directions.
CHANGE OF VENUE-Welborn vs. Bucci-No. 13580-Decided Oc-

tober 8, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Welborn, who was sued in the county court, applied for a change
of venue, which was denied. Standing on his motion he suffered default
and judgment to go against him, but appealed to the district court,
where his motion for change of venue was again denied and default
again entered, and he brings this case here for review.
1. Th Code of Civil Procedure provided that in all other cases
(including the case at bar) the action shall be tried in a county in
which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement
of the action, or in the county where the plaintiff resides when service
is made on the defendant, in such county

*

*

*.

Actions upon con-

tracts may be tried in the county in which the contract was to be performed

*

*

*

In this case the defendant was served in county of plaintiff's residence and this was an action upon a contract and it is clear that under
the code provision a trial could properly be had, if not in the county of
defendant's residence, then only in the county in which the contract was
to be performed.
The action was brought in the county where the defendant resided
and also in the county where the contract was to be performed and the
court below did not abuse its discretion in denying the application for
a change of venue.--Judgment affirmed.
INFANTS-DEPENDENT--JURISDICTION

OF

JUVENILE

COURT-

PARENTAGE-RAPE-Dikeou vs. The People, etc., in the Interests of Cassidenti-No. 13585-Decided October 15, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. A child is dependent, even though it obtains all its necessary
sustenance from its mother, if the mother is without means of support
and must be cared for by charity.
2. The juvenile courts have authority to determine the question
of dependency. Even though the statutes do not specifically give -said
courts authority to determine the question of parentage, such authority
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is conferred by necessary implication, the legislative interest being made
clear by Sec. 650, C. L. 1921.
In a dependency proceeding the juvenile court is not deprived
3.
of jurisdiction through the circumstance that defendant's fatherhood of
the child arose from the commission of a rape.
4. Fact that the questions of non-support and parentage might
have been tried in other courts under different statutory provisions does
not deprive the juvenile court of the jurisdiction given it in juvenile
delinquency and dependency cases.--Judgmentaffirmed.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES-EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT-CONFUSION OF
GOODS-InternationalHarvester Co. us. McFerson-No. 13587
-Decided October 15, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
McFerson sued one Olander and obtained judgment for $1,800.00.
It
In aid of execution the Great Western Sugar Co. was garnisheed.
answered that it owed Olander for sugar beets over $2,600.00 which
was claimed by the Harvester Co. and others. The Harvester Co. intervened, claiming a part of the proceeds under its chattel mortgage.
McFerson had judgment and the Harvester Co. brings error.
1. A chattel mortgage upon "my full undivided one-half interest in ten acres of sugar beets" where at the date of the mortgage the
mortgagee had over 40 acres in the field, such mortgage is invalid for
uncertainty in description.
The doctrine of equitable assignment to reach cash proceeds
2.
of sale of mortgaged property only applies where a fixed proportion is
specified.
The mortgagee is only protected by the doctrine of confusion
3.
of goods under which it would be entitled to a pro rata share where
there was an original separation of the mortgaged property.
4. The doctrine of confusion of goods does not apply where the
commingling was with the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee.Judgment affirmed.
BANKS-STOCKHOLDERS' DOUBLE LIABILITY-COLORABLE TRANSFER OF STOCK-McFerson us. Anderson-No. 13590-Decided
October 15, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
The State Bank Commissioner seeks reversal of a judgment which
dismissed an action brought by him against Anderson to recover on
his statutory liability as a shareholder in a state bank.
Where a stockholder in a state bank transfers his shares of
I.
stock for an insignificant amount in cash and takes a note for the balance with no expectation that the note will be paid, such transaction
is merely colorable.
2.
Under these circumstances the seller of the stock was still the
equitable owner even though the stock had been transferred.
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3. Such party is not exempt from statutory liability even though
the stock he transferred is held as collateral security for the payment of
the note because the note did not represent a bona fide debt.-Judgment
reversed.
ELECTIONS-CONTEST--SERVICE-----TIME

TO PRESENT DEFENSES-

rtse vs. Richards-No. 13618Decided October 15, 1934-Per Curiam.
1. In an election contest following a primary election, an attempt
was made to obtain service on the defendant contestee at his place of
residence on the fourth day after the election. Defendant was absent
on business which had taken him to another part of the state. He returned on Sunday, the fifth day after the election, but was not personally served until Monday. Prior to the end of the fifth day after the
election copies of the summons and petition had been left with the clerk
of the court in ostensible compliance with the last sentence of Sec. 7574,
C. L. 1921. Held, said portion of Sec. 7574 did not apply under the
facts shown, and the service was defective. A motion to dismiss the
proceeding was sustained.
2. Contestee had filed a demurrer on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of defective service and on the ground of insufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action. Such demurrer had been filed at
the same time as the motion to dismiss. Primary election contests require early determinattion. A summary procedure has been provided
for such purpose and it is proper to present all defenses at the same time.
Consequently, the filing of the demurrer simultaneously with the motion was not a waiver of objection to the defective service.
3. The petition in a contest proceeding must allege facts which
will enable the court to determine that a different result will follow in
the vote by reason of such facts. It is not sufficient to set out mere
general conclusions.-Judgment affirmed.
SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION--

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-CERTIFICATES-CONSTRUCTION-STATUS AS SHAREHOLDER OR CREDITOR-INTEREST

PAYMENTS--Exchange National Bank, etc., vs. Receivers of the
City Savings, Building and Loan Association-No. 13490-Decided October 22, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. A certificate, entitled "Certificate of Deposit," issued by a
building and loan association, reciting the deposit with it of a specified
sum of money by a named person, repayable at a definite time, with interest at a rate therein stated, and which further recites: "The person
named hereinabove is a member of said Association, and is the owner
of one share for each One Hundred Dollars of the amount hereof," is
a certificate of stock. The holder thereof is a shareholder and member
of the association, not a creditor.
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2.

The status of the certificate holder is the same as that above

stated, even though the certificate, otherwise identical with one described

above, states that the certificate holder is the owner of such stock, "if
issued."
3. Fact that the certificate uses the word "interest" to describe
the return stipulated in the certificate does not mark the transaction as
a loan to the association.--Judgmentaffirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT---SCOPE OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY-PRINCIPAL'S KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT'S ACTS-Zeller, et al. vs. Taylor
-No. 13564-Zeller, et al. vs. The Morey Mercantile Company
-No.
13565-Decided October 22, 1934-Opinions by Mr.
Justice Butler.
The scope of an agent's employment is to be determined, not alone
from what the principal may have told the agent to do, but from what
he knows, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to know, the agent
is doing in the transaction. Agency and the extent of the agent's
authority may be proved by circumstances. Facts examined and determination made that the principals were bound by purchases made for
them by the agent.-Judgments affirmed.
EXECUTION-WRONGFUL LEVY-DEMAND ON THE SHERIFF-HO!-

lenbeck vs. The People, for the Use of Churchill-No. 13298Decided October 22, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
1. The defendant, Hollenbeck, as sheriff of Chaffee county,
levied an execution on a judgment against E. 0. Churchill against property which was conclusively proved by the evidence to belong to Mrs.
Churchill. Prior to the time of the levy, the sheriff was notified and
advised by Mrs. Churchill and by her attorney concerning this fact.
2. The main objection to the verdict was that Mrs. Churchill
had never made a demend of the sheriff for possession of her property.
Where, as here, the sheriff was forewarned, such a demand is not necessary.-Judgment affirmed.
MINING CLAIMS-TITLES TO--WITNESSES EXCLUDED--CROSS ExAMINATION UNDER STATUTE-ORDER OF PROOF-Kline et al.

vs. Slater et al.-No. 13075-DecidedOctober 22, 1934---Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. U. S. Code, Title 30, Sec. 30, provided for actions to determine the fee in mining property. It is not proper, therefore, to attempt
to secure an adjudication of equitable interests in an action brought
under this section. A motion to strike parts of a complaint setting up
the interests of a trustee was properly sustained.
2. When witnesses are excluded, pursuant to call, and one not
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knowing of the rule, listened to part of the testimony and was later
used as a witness, it is not error unless the record discloses some prejudice. It was a matter within the court's discretion.
3. An objection was made to cross examination under the statute, attacking the defendant's claim. The objection was sustained on
the ground of order of proof. Order of proof is discretionary with the
court within reasonable limits.--judment affirmed.
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